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31. Introduction
Around 1990 Nicaragua entered a period of economic stabilization and adjustments after many years
of social and economic turbulence1. Markets have been deregulated, the domestic currency deflated,
public expenditures reduced and the tax system reformed. The reform process implemented various
measures crucial to long term development. The transition period, however, has imposed large scale
unemployment and increased poverty on a substantial part of the population. Negative long term
effects may occur due to increased poverty and deterioration of public education and health services.
Also, long term effects on future production capacity and future income generation may be related to
deterioration of the natural resource base, for instance if poverty intensifies the pressure on
agricultural land and forest reserves.
The focus of this paper is on the impact of structural adjustment policy on deforestation in Nicaragua.
Several factors have initiated a migration wave towards the forests for subsistence farming. After
several years of war, the forests are again accessible for people. The economic crisis and rising
unemployment have set fire to deforestation, literally speaking. A population growth of 3.2 per cent
provides an overall pressure on natural resources.
In our approach we highlight the interrelation between poverty, employment opportunities and
deforestation caused by migration to the agricultural frontier in Nicaragua. We question how particular
policy elements like tax reform, reduced public expenditures and improved external balance affect the
pressure on the still significant humid tropical forests of Nicaragua. For this purpose we employ a
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model containing an informal food producing frontier sector,
advancing into forest land. Forest soil provides land for subsistence farming over a few years, but
thereafter deteriorates rapidly, causing deforestation to go on even with a constant population of
squatters. In the model, general economic policies affect the flow of new settlers to forest reserves by
providing more or less attractive alternative wage income opportunities within the market economy.
In the literature so far the deforestation problem has mainly been dealt with in a partial manner and the
actual linkages between general economic policies and the pressure on forests remain diffuse. In a
recent theoretical approach, Deacon (1995) discusses the impact of tax policies on deforestation and
the social welfare within a general equilibrium framework. Deacon treats land as homogenous input in
a single agricultural sector. So do Thiele and Wiebelt (1995) in an empirical model for Cameroon.
Thus, it is the general development in supply and demand of an aggregate agricultural good which is
driving the demand for input of land in those models. This conceals some important aspects in rural
production technology and income generation which might affect the land use and rate of
deforestation.
First, the production technology at the agricultural frontier is far more labour and land intensive than
the average, stationary cultivation practices. Technology is determined by the lack of infrastructure,
making commercial input like fertilizer and pesticides too expensive and production for markets
practically beyond reach. This means that various general economic policies might affect the more
intensively producing permanent agriculture without penetrating to the agricultural frontier. Second, at
the frontier, crops are grown for subsistence. When dealing with the deforestation problem, this has
important consequences. The link between deforestation and economic policy in developing countries
may primarily be found in the labour market and the off-frontier potential for income generation, and
not so much in the changes in the market for agricultural crops in general. Various policies might
affect stationary and frontier farming differently and thus generate different deforestation rates,
although they have similar impacts on total production in agriculture. Our approach seeks to bring
more realism into the policy analysis of deforestation in this respect.
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 See Gibson (1993) for an economic analysis of this period.
4Other empirical and economywide approaches to deforestation frequently deal with the deforestation
pressure generated by commercial logging. Thiele and Wiebelt (1995) integrate a forward looking
forestry sector in their CGE framework for Cameroon. Persson and Munasinghe (1995) goes one step
further and includes deforestation by squatters for either logging or subsistence farming in Costa Rica.
An interesting result of this study is that stumpage price increases will reduce deforestation for
logging, but total deforestation will nevertheless increase, because general equilibrium effects shift
resources towards agriculture. The fact that indirect allocation effects may differ in direction and even
dominate over the direct effect identified in partial equilibrium analysis clearly demonstrates the
importance of using an economywide approach. To capture these indirect effects of economic reforms
on the deforestation rate in Nicaragua, we apply a CGE model. By including land clearing subsistence
farming in forest reserves in the model, we look for determinants of migration to forest reserves
through income and consumer options facing the labour force.
In section 2 we briefly describe the CGE core model and in more detail present the modelling of
technology and income generation at the agricultural frontier. Section 3 outlines the business as usual
scenario and describes the policy reforms which we will focus on. Section 4 presents results from
model runs while section 5 concludes.
2. The model
2.1. CGE core model
The core model was developed at the Business School of Central America (INCAE) in Managua and
further developed for environmental analysis in cooperation with Statistics Norway (see De Franco et
al. (1993), Alfsen et al. (1996)). Producers and consumers behave as maximizers of profits and utility
respectively. Markets for goods clear, but labour faces the possibility of unemployment, which runs
high in Nicaragua. There is no capital market, reflecting the inadequate credit facilities. The model is
calibrated to 1991 data.
2.1.1. Producers
There are 27 sectors each producing a single commodity. Among these are 12 agricultural sectors,
classified as rural, all others are urban sectors. Commodities are produced by labour, capital and
intermediates. The intermediates are used in fixed proportions to the production levels. Demand for
labour is determined by equating the value of the marginal production of labour to the wage rate, and
is decreasing in the real wage rate. Each sector receives a fixed share of total nominal investments.
Production functions are Cobb Douglas, except in the agricultural frontier sector where the only input
factor, labour, is proportional to output, which is a linear composite of basic grains.
2.1.2. Labour market
Total labour supply is growing by a constant rate based on population growth forecasts. There is
unemployment in the urban sector, since migration to cities is positive as long as expected urban
income, adjusted for the probability of getting a job, is higher than at the countryside. The model is
run in two different versions, with constant and flexible real urban wage, respectively, to illustrate two
extremes among wage formation rules and unemployment regimes.
2.1.3. Social classes and distribution
The income distribution is the driving force behind migration of labour. To state this force explicitly,
the model traces the income of 5 social classes: Campesinos, Frontier farmers, Workers, Petty
capitalists and Capitalists. Income consists of profit, wages and transfers from abroad. Campesinos
earn rent as agricultural smallholders, while big agricultural producers are counted as Capitalists.
Workers earn their wages, in either urban or rural sectors, and frontier farmers earn the imputed
income from their production of basic grain. Capitalists receive a share of rural profit and urban profit,
while Petty capitalists (informal producers) receive a share of profits in urban sectors. Each of the 5
5classes has a consumption pattern formalized as a linear expenditure system. For capitalists, the
minimum consumption is 10 per cent, for workers and petty capitalists 15 per cent, and 20 per cent for
campesinos. At the agricultural frontier, the total production is used for autoconsumption.
2.1.4. Saving and investment
Private savings equals total income less taxes and total private expenditure. There are highly different
saving rates among classes, hence the income distribution strongly influences the level of total saving.
The public sector benefits from foreign transfers, through official development assistance, while
workers, capitalists and petty capitalists benefit from private remittances. Public saving is a residual of
public revenues less exogenous public expenditure.
Investments in real capital is determined by total savings. Foreign savings are assumed to be constant;
so domestic savings are the essential variables for determining the economic growth potential. A
dominant share of domestic savings stems from profit, while workers and campesinoes contribute
insignificantly.
The capital stock in period t+1 is equal to the capital stock in period t less depreciation plus
investment in period t. Allocation of investment by destination is determined by fixed (base year)
coefficients. The sectoral pattern of investment by destination is translated into demand for investment
goods by sector of origin.
2.1.5. Foreign trade
Domestically produced goods compete with foreign goods both on the world market and at home. It is
assumed that domestically produced commodities and imported goods of the same category are non-
perfect substitutes (the Armington assumption). The higher the price of the domestically produced
commodity relative to the price of the imported variety, the higher is the import share. The lower the
price on exports relative to the world market price, the higher are the exports. World market prices are
exogenous, and the nominal exchange rate is set by the government. The prices of imported and
exported goods are determined as the world market prices multiplied by the exchange rate and
adjusted for tariffs.
Below we discuss in more detail the production system at the agricultural frontier and how we model
the links between the frontier and the rest of the economy.
2.2. Production technology at the agricultural frontier
The agricultural land expands in many directions, and the frontier is no clearly defined area. However,
in Nicaragua today, there are two distinct areas which are colonial centres, combining the features of
rapid expansion of cultivation with the availability of virgin forest. These areas are Bosawas in the
north and Indio-Maiz in the south, both forest reserves. The migrators are settling with a cultivation
pattern and a technology which is described below, based on surveys of the frontier activity carried
out by the Ministry of the Environment (GTZ/MARENA, 1992) and CIPRES (1992). The production
system is more thoroughly described by Monge A. (1995).
Table 1 presents the labour and land characteristics of a typical squatter family. The representative
family of 8 persons disposes on average 4 man-years of labour, which means that big children and
women take part in production (although minors below 12 years are assumed not to contribute). The
family clears about 12 manzanas (1 mz = 0.7 ha) to keep aggressive vegetation and shadow on suitable
distance from an actually cultivated plot size of 8 mz. The climate allows for 3 seasons per year (24
mz-seasons).
6Table 1. Representative family farm at the frontier
Family size Labour
(manyear1)
Deforested
area(mz)
Plot size
(mz)
Seasons Cultivated area
annual basis (mz)
8 4 12 8 3 24
1
 Not including the labour of children below 12 years.
Table 2. Production at representative frontier farm
Cultivated
area (mz)
Yield,
(QQ1)/mz)
Gross output
(QQ)
Per cent
loss
Net output
(QQ)
Maize 12 20 240 30 168
Beans 8 10 80 30 56
Rice 4 35 140 30 98
Sources:Yields: GTZ/MARENA, CIPRES (man-days per mz)
1) QQ = quintales
Table 2 depicts the typical allocation of labour on the 3 cultivated crops, taken from CIPRES (1992).
The crop pattern allocates 12 mz-seasons to maize, 8 mz-seasons to beans and 4 mz-seasons to rice.
Representative yields of maize, beans and rice are 20, 10 and 35 quintales (QQ) respectively. The
family labour produces 33.6 QQ of maize, 11.2 QQ of beans and 19.6 QQ of rice on average per man-
year, when a 30 per cent harvest loss is taken into account.
Table 3. Production and imputed income per man-year
Production per man-
year (QQ)
Output price (C$/QQ) Imputed frontier
income per average
man-year by activity
(C$)
Maize 42.0 38.7  1 625.4
Beans 14.0 48.9 684.6
Rice 24.5 46.8  1 146.6
Prices are taken from Economic indicators from the Central Bank (BCN, 1994a) presenting US$
prices for important agricultural products in Managua.
The fragile forest soil is degrading rapidly due to current management practice. Consequently, after 3
years a plot is abandoned and new land is cleared. Hence, even a stagnant population at the frontier
drives the deforestation process. In addition, the high population growth combined with the
widespread poverty and unemployment in Nicaragua further encourage migration to the frontier where
income after all is secure and does not fall below a subsistence level due to the practically unrestricted
access to forest land.
According to the stylized description above, the frontier labour force (LFt) produces zlmz , zlfr and zlar
units of maize, beans and rice respectively per man-year. The corresponding frontier production level
for a single crop b is
(1) bt b btXF = zl LF ,        b (mz, fr,ar)∈
where b represents maize (mz), beans (fr) and rice (ar). This production level generates an imputed
income WFt per man-year
(2) t b bt bWF = PF zl         b (mz, fr,ar)Σ , ∈
7at the frontier. This is the level of income which is attracting migrators or not, depending on
alternative income opportunities in the economy. The product price obtained at the frontier (PFtb) is in
the model set equal to the price (Ptb) facing the market integrated producers of basic grains (maize,
beans and rice) in the economy:
(3) bt btPF  =  P           b (mz, fr,ar)∈
Production at the frontier is for autoconsumption and as such, the output of grain has a basic value
independent of market prices. However, for accounting purposes it is reasonable to calculate an
imputed income based on general market prices. The important assumption for the result is that a
change in market prices signalizes a change in the alternative cost of remaining within the market
economy and not get access to the frontier diet. If frontier production had been commercialized, farm
gate prices would in general be lower than in central agricultural areas with better infrastructure and
lower transportation cost. By assuming that all output is for autoconsumption we disregard the fact
that a minor share of output is commercialized, for instance as pigs walking their way to some local
marketplace.
Alternative occupation and income is available in the established rural economy, and in urban areas
with a probability less than one. Equilibrium is obtained when there is equality between the expected
income options. The rural wage level WRt , which is an index for wages in established rural production
sectors, is equal to the urban wage level WU0, adjusted for the probability of being employed in urban
sectors:
(4) t tWR  =  (1- UR )WU0
URt is the share of unemployed in the urban economy which is where unemployment exists.
Farming at the frontier is primarily an alternative to rural farming. We assume that landless labourers
in rural farming leave for the frontier if income at the frontier is large relative to income in rural
farming.
In considering how to model this relationship, an extreme alternative would assume that people leave
for the frontier if income at the frontier is larger than income in rural farming, making the income
levels equal in equilibrium. A less extreme alternative, which we chose, is to assume a constant
elasticity of transformation (CET) macro relationship between working in rural farming and working
at the frontier. This relationship means that some landless labourers leave for the frontier immediately
when income at the frontier exceeds income in rural agriculture. Other needs a larger income incentive
in order to move, for reasons of transport costs, non-pecuniary preferences or risk aversion. In
equilibrium, a non-zero income differential is associated with a finite stock of frontier farmers.
To model the CET relationship, we use the dual and specify the macro index of income in rural
agriculture and the frontier:
(5) WX WF WRt t t= +[ ( ) ( ) ]η ηρ ρ ρ1 2
1
WX is the macro index of income, ρ  indicates the elasticity of substitution. We define the stock of
frontier farmers as a function of income relative to the wage index (which, since the wage index
consists of frontier income and rural income, is equivalent to defining it as a function of frontier
income relative to rural income):
(6) LF LS WF WXt t t t= −η ρ1 1[ / ]
8to describe the labour market, it remains to determine the stock of landless rural labourers. To do so,
the model allocates potential labourers between urban unemployed and rural labour such that the
urban unemployed equal the number necessary for the expected urban wage to equal rural income for
the landless labourer.
Total labour supply (LSt) in the economy grows at an annual rate g
(7) t tLS  =  LS0(1+ g )
where LS0 is the base year labour supply.
Deforestation consists of two elements. One is land cleared by new colonists, and the other is land
cleared by the population which has settled at an earlier time, but have to clear new land due to rapid
degradation of soil. The deforested area in year t (DFt ) is:
(8) t t t-1 t-1DF  =  A[LF - LF + LF ]1 3/
where A is the average cleared area per man-year. We assume that 1/3 of formerly settled frontier
farmers have to clear new land each year. This formulation ignores the fact that frontier population is
composed of colonial waves with various strength over the years, but this is a minor omission.
3. Structural adjustment policy and deforestation
To assess the impact of economic reforms on deforestation we have chosen policy scenarios
containing some central stabilization and adjustment elements. These are reducing public
expenditures, broadening the tax base, and narrowing the foreign trade gap (devaluation). Below we
sketch the background for implementing these policy measures and finally some characteristics of the
business as usual scenario. The policy simulations represent a mixture of implemented and planned
policies which we simulate over a 10-year period.
1) Reducing government expenditures
The Government of Nicaragua faced the challenge to improve fiscal balance in order to ease the
inflation pressure in the economy. To reduce the public deficit, the total employment in public sector
has been reduced by about 180 thousand employees. Of these, 20 thousand were laid off from the
central government's civil staff, while the rest were laid off from defence and public enterprises in
roughly equal shares (Government of Nicaragua, 1996). The consequent rise in unemployment can be
expected to reduce migration to urban areas by lowering the probability of getting a job and hence the
expected income from urban work. The pressure on land might increase. It remains to be seen from
model runs to which extent this pressure will affect virgin forests.
2) Increasing government revenues by broadening the tax base while harmonizing tax rates
According to World Bank (1993), around 30 per cent of total tax revenues were still collected from
eleven enterprises in an early phase of the reforms. We focus on the impact of broadening the base for
a sales tax. Since agricultural sales still are practically beyond reach of tax collection, the
administrative system must be developed to deal with this. A significant widening of the tax base to
include the rural sectors is a medium or long term policy - not actually an implemented reform so far.
By means of a more efficient administration, public revenues have increased from 16 per cent of GDP
in 1990 to 26 per cent in 1995 (Government of Nicaragua, 1996). To illustrate a possible impact of
broadening the tax base, we study the case of increasing the effective indirect tax on urban sectors by
5 percentage. In rural sectors the tax rates are increased by 3 percentage points after 4 years of
reforms, assuming that the government has managed to build up the administrative capacity to widen
the rural tax base by then. Since government consumption is exogenous in this simulation, the
increased revenue is directly transformed to a similar increase in public saving (and total saving).
93) Narrowing the trade balance gap
A macro-devaluation initiated the stabilization efforts in 1991, and was followed by a 20 per cent
devaluation in 1993. Thereafter, the government carried out a crawling peg exchange rate policy.
During devaluations the economy was supported by a strong inflow of foreign aid. Future
developments are supposed to rely considerably less on foreign aid, and foreign borrowing options are
limited. Hence we study the impact of a reduction in the foreign deficit, which also is to be interpreted
as an effect of devaluation.
The impact of these measures (under the assumption of constant real wages) are presented in section 4.
In addition, the cumulative effect of the same policies is studied under a flexible wage regime. The
characteristics of the base case or business as usual scenario are given below.
4) Business as usual
The Business As Usual - scenario (BAU) portraits the continuation of base year behaviour and
policies. The labour force is assumed to grow at an annual rate of 3.4 per cent The population growth
was estimated to be 3.2 per cent in the years 1990-1995 and is expected to fall to an average of about
3.0 per cent for the years 1995-2000. (Comision Nacional de Poblacion, 1994). Considering that the
population is very young at present, we assume that the working population will grow somewhat faster
than the total population in the simulation period.
Tax revenue is mainly generated from a sales tax of 15 per cent. Industries as defined in our model
face different rates according to the various exemptions and inefficiencies in tax collection. The rural
sectors practically pay no taxes. This is even so for coffee which is an important export crop.
A few adjustments are made to catch some changes likely to occur. The saving rate of campesinos was
negative in 1991, owing to credit supply combined with limited enforcement of debt services. A
negative saving rate may, however, be a poor estimate of future saving practice because reforms in the
financial sector has restricted credit and also seek to re-enforce payment of debts services. This
institutional reform is not explicitly dealt with here. However, we have assumed that the campesino
saving rate may turn positive because less producer credit is available, and payback ratios are forced
upwards. Also, an implicit taxation of agricultural production is phased out by deregulation of
agricultural marketing. This may increase rural income and leave more for saving and investment. To
account for these possible effects, the campesino saving rate is set to 2.5 per cent after 1991, which is
roughly the same level as for workers and urban petty capitalists.
The BAU assumes a constant real urban wage while the level of urban unemployment is variable. The
threat of social conflicts and disorder might possibly unite employers and labour unions on
approximately such terms.
Public expenditures are assumed to grow at an annual rate of 1.8 per cent. The Business As Usual
scenario is mirroring shrinking investments, increasing unemployment and an annual decline of 3 per
cent in GDP. The annually deforested area is increasing by almost 10 per cent per year, making total
deforestation in the reserves more than twice the base year level after 10 years.
The BAU is not a sustainable path, but base year behaviour and restrictions offers a reference point for
analysis of various economic reforms, and levels of external financing. A main factor behind future
sustainability not thoroughly dealt with in this study, is the potential for technological change and
increased efficiency following a reorientation of economic policy. The moderate assumption of a 0.5
per cent technological progress is included in the model runs. Urban sector efficiency might be
expected to improve above this rate, while technological progress in agricultural sectors might be
more uncertain, being contingent upon infrastructure and marketing facilities which are not
immediately provided by deregulation.
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4. Results from policy simulations
Below we present the results for each scenario by first pointing at the short term effects of the
implemented policies, and thereafter commenting the outcome after 10 simulation periods. Table 4
presents the output of model runs by the end of the horizon. Figure 1 presents the effect of single
policy measures on GDP, unemployment rate, private consumption and deforestation. Figure 2
displays the development of rural and urban per capita income along with the change in deforestation.
4.1. Reduced public expenditures
During the period 1990 - 95, fiscal policy has been a key element in the stabilization process. The non-
financial public sector balance improved from an 18 per cent deficit in 1990 to a surplus from 1992
on. In this scenario, the annual growth in public expenditures is lowered from 1.8 per cent in BAU to 1
per cent.
The direct effect of reducing public expenditures is an increase in public savings and the level of
investments. Initially - before additional investments has expanded the productive capacity - the
impact of improved fiscal balance is a reallocation of resources towards production of investments
goods within the same resource constraints as in the BAU.
Investment demand is directed towards construction and private services, mainly met by domestic
supply. The same applies to public demand. What happens when public sector lowers demand is that
additional demand for investment goods is taking over for public expenditures. Consequently, no
significant structural changes take place in domestic and foreign markets, conserving the terms of
trade. However, second order price effects tend to favour agricultural sectors. These price effects,
together with an increase in urban unemployment of 0.4 per cent make the outcome of frontier farming
improve slightly in relative terms, and the annual deforestation increases by 0.3 per cent after 2 years.
However, it is an important conclusion that tightening of the budget does not imply mass
unemployment and exodus to the agricultural frontier in the short term.
The short term increase in investment is not taking place at the expense of private consumption, and
demand for agricultural products is maintained. The average rural income level is positively affected.
Average income for the urban working population (employed or self employed) is also increasing (0.4
per cent), reflecting that profit in informal sector is rising. There is an increase in urban
unemployment, though. Still, including the unemployed, the average income for the urban population
as a whole, is constant. The rural population has a considerably lower income level than the urban
population. Consequently, there are some immediate positive distributional elements of this policy, but
they are conditional upon increased consumption of natural resource capital, and an increase in urban
unemployment. The social impact of increased unemployment is clearly negative, but empirical
evidence indicates that family income in the dominant urban region Managua-Masaya is a composite
of wage income and profit in self employed production of goods and services (IHC, 1986). A broad
segment of the urban population might then share benefits as well as disadvantages of this policy,
which keeps the average urban income stable in the short term.
The reduction in government spending launches a process of capital accumulation. Over time,
increased investments expands the production capacity and income is increasing. By year 2000, GDP
is 4.7 per cent above BAU as shown in table 4. Private consumption is also increasing, although
slightly less (3.1 per cent).
The investments raise labour productivity and allow for an overall long term increase in profits and
real rural wages. The higher rural wages attract workers more than being an unemployed urban poor,
and the unemployment rate is reduced by 2.3 per cent compared with BAU by the end of the
simulation period. The rural per capita income level (consisting of real wage income plus campesino
share of profit) is increasing by 0.5 per cent. The average urban income level is increased by as much
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as 3.3 per cent since the number of unemployed urban workers falls and profit increases for small
urban producers.
The frontier farmers do not invest in capital equipment, but compensate declining soil productivity
with fresh natural land capital. Hence, productivity is stagnant at frontier farms, which are lagging
behind in comparison with the rural wage earners who are the social basis for migration to the frontier.
Less people than in the BAU are so poor that remote subsistence farming feels like a better option, and
the clearing of forests is reduced. The annual rate of deforestation is reduced by 4.8 per cent compared
with BAU. Taking into account that the initial effect of this policy was an increase in migration to the
frontier, this indicates a more significant positive long term effect on deforestation beyond our time
horizon. Total deforested area over the simulation period is reduced by 1.8 per cent.
Overall, the policy implies less deforestation. The level of private consumption is conserved in the
process of accumulation and growth, which in the early phase of reform is beneficial to the rural
population. However, over time the urban population gains more from this policy than the rural. Both
unemployed and frontier farmers merge into the stationary agricultural sectors where real wages
increase by about 2.5 per cent, but profit in agricultural sectors is not increasing much and rural per
capita income is lagging behind the urban income level growth.
4.2. Sales tax reform
To mobilize resources for public services and investments, economic reform programs aim at
broadening the tax base. Nicaragua has recently increased the government’s current income from 16.5
per cent of GDP in 1990 to 26.8 per cent in 1995 (Government of Nicaragua,1996). In this scenario we
study the effect of increasing the sales tax in urban sectors by 5 percentage points. In the less formal
rural sectors, a sales tax of 3 per cent is introduced by year 5. Scenario 2 in Table 4 represents the
combined effect of both reduced public expenditures and the sales tax reform by the end of the
simulation period.
Initially, only urban sectors face increasing tax rates. The tax increase lowers net producer prices and
profits, and the short term response of urban companies is to lay off workers, since urban real wages
are rigid. The increase in investments enhances labour productivity, but in an early phase this is small
and incapable to compensate fully for the contractive effect of lower urban net producer prices, even
though investments mainly are allocated to urban production sectors.
The loss of private income through rising unemployment and the decline in profits makes private
consumption fall by 9 per cent after 2 years. Food is a significant element in consumer demand and
prices on food crops fall considerably. Due to the decline in food prices, the terms of trade between
basic grains and other consumer goods change markedly. This leaves frontier farmers in a different
position. In their remote settlements they do not have the option to substitute general consumer goods
for basic grains. When food becomes cheaper relative to other consumer goods, it is perceived as
increasingly beneficial to get access to and choose from a wider basket of goods and services available
to rural and urban labourers. Hence, people tend to leave the frontier. This effect dominates over the
impact of increasing urban unemployment, which lowers the expected urban wage income and makes
people less inclined to stay at the frontier. The annual rate of deforestation falls to 8 per cent below
BAU as a short term effect.
Although the urban sector is the one being levied an additional tax at this stage, the rural sector is
carrying the main burden. Real rural wages are reduced by about 5 per cent. Still, the number of rural
workers is falling almost 6 per cent and rural labourers are turned into urban unemployed poor.
In the short term, the urban sales tax generates an economic contraction and engrave the distributional
differences between cities and the countryside. But forest land is preserved even during this crisis due
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to the increasing relative disadvantage of generating income through basic grain production for
subsistence.
Rural sectors are taxed from 1995, contributing to a further increase in public saving and investments.
The higher level of investments eventually gives an additional value added. In year 2000, GDP is 1.6
per cent above the previous scenario and 6.3 per cent above BAU. However, this long term benefit is
obtained at a high cost in the sense that the level of private consumption is reduced almost 6
percentage points compared with the reduced public expenditure scenarios (to a level of 3 per cent
below BAU).
The long term benefits in forest conservation are significant, though. The annual rate of deforestation
is reduced by 9 per cent (to 14 per cent below annual deforestation in BAU) after 9 years. The
migration from the countryside to the cities is dampened, but unemployment remains almost 5 per cent
above BAU.
The urban population (including the unemployed) has got its per capita income reduced by 6 per cent
compared with the previous scenario (to 3 per cent below BAU). The elements included in the average
per capita urban income are urban wages and profits in informal sector. For those who are employed
or (informally) self employed in the cities, the per capita income level is slightly reduced, because
profit in the informal sector is negatively affected. The main change in the urban real income level is
due to increased unemployment. The rural sector suffers from the considerable fall in rural real wages.
Except for the beneficial impact on natural resources, there seems to be little to gain from the tax
reform within the first decade. But the high investment level which has turned the result from a sharp
decline in activity level early on to some positive medium term results might embed a potential for
even higher growth and lower unemployment in the longer term, in particular if the technological
improvements associated with the higher investment rates are taken into account. However, if a
significant contribution to economic growth and increased welfare will come after 15 years or so, the
younger half of the population at that time would have been waiting all their childhood for
improvements in nutrition, health and education so crucial and conditional for long term development.
The long term structural impact of the tax reform might still be beneficial, but the tax reform as a
means of stabilization should be complemented by measures which increase productivity and
compensate the rural population where the incidence of poverty is high.
The investments are increased by roughly the same magnitude in this tax reform scenario as in the
previous scenario. In the case of reducing public expenditure, growth is stimulated from the outset and
over the whole decade, rising GDP 4.7 per cent above BAU in year 2000. Financing the same amount
of investments by indirect taxes only adds 1.6 per cent to GDP within our time horizon. Why does it
make such a difference whether investments are financed by cutting expenditures or raising the tax
rate? The reason for sluggish performance under the tax reform may be that raising the urban sales tax
eats up the initial growth impulse created by the investments generated by the tax revenue. Urban
sectors dominate the investment activity, so the potential to enhance growth through investments in
the current regime lies within the urban economy. When urban sales taxes are increased, the
investment induced increase in labour productivity and profits is withdrawn. Actually, the urban
economy is contracting, and through lay offs and lower levels of income and consumption this
strongly affects the rural income level. Over time, increased growth is showing up, but the rural
income is lagging behind the urban income growth. Rural growth and welfare depend upon the level
of private consumption and the associated demand for food crops, since (credit and) investments do
not reach far out in the fields. More direct gains from increased productivity through investments are
not easily available to the countryside.
When cutting public expenditures, this self-defeating mechanism involving urban investments and
urban taxes does not show up. Additional investments are allowed to generate increased urban income
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which keeps up demand for food and generates rural income as well. Also, the composition of
domestic demand is hardly disturbed when increased investment demand is substituted for public
demand. The sectoral structure remains stable, ensuring that no income loss occurs due to structural
changes, since sectors differ somewhat with respect to profitability.
4.3. Reducing foreign transfers
Stabilization and structural reforms are implemented to stimulate growth and investments and thus
reduce dependency on foreign development assistance. In this scenario we trace the impact of
reducing the external deficit by US$ 50 millions per year from 1995, a 15 per cent annual reduction
compared to the BAU deficit level. The policy is implemented late in the simulation period, so the
time horizon is short anyway. The results effect short or medium term effects (5 simulation periods)
only.
As a first order effect, the reduction in foreign savings is to lower total investments equally much.
However, although economic growth is hampered to the extent that nearly all GDP gains from the
sales tax is neutralized, the investment level is not reduced proportionally due to relative price effects.
When the inflow of foreign currency is reduced, the stricter trade balance forces the real exchange rate
upwards, protecting exports, while imports nearly falls to BAU level, in spite of an activity level 5 per
cent above the reference scenario. The domestic price level is falling, and investment demand, which
mainly consists of domestic goods and services, is encouraged by the relative change between
domestic and world market price levels.
The decline in activity level increases the level of urban unemployment. The increase in the
unemployment rate lowers the expected wage income in the cities, and the equilibrium rural wage is
reduced more than the urban nominal wage level. The rural population is getting poorer. Per capita
real income is reduced by 1 per cent to 10 per cent below BAU. Behind this change lies a reduction in
real rural wages (0.5 per cent) and a decline in rural profits (2 per cent). Fewer opportunities for
earning rural wage income will generally encourage migration to the frontier and to the cities.
However, urban demand for labour is hardly increasing and the migrators are adding to the number of
unemployed. The urban average income is reduced by 1.5 per cent at the end of the simulation period.
Average incomes for both the urban and rural population are reduced. Still, deforestation is only
slightly increased. The migration flow is held back because food items (basic grains) are becoming
relatively cheaper in the markets, and partly compensates for the effect of the fall in income levels.
Hence, the income level and not deforestation is of concern when the external deficit is being reduced.
4.4. Flexible wages
So far, the policies introduced in the scenarios have moved GDP in year 2000 a few per cent above
BAU. Such gains are significant if combined with beneficial distributional effect and less pressure on
natural capital, but do not qualify as a take off in a development context. A common feature of these
scenarios is that they hinge upon the assumption that rigidities in the labour market are sustained
during the simulation period of 10 years. If they do not, and real wages in urban sectors start to
respond to the level of unemployment, the outcome might turn out differently. In the following
scenario, it is assumed that the real urban wage is flexible, and that the market is successful in
stabilizing the unemployment at 9 per cent, assumed to be a structurally determined minimum level.
All policies introduced in earlier scenarios are retained.
By removing the assumption of rigid urban real wages, the profitability is increasing and GDP jumps
to a level of 9 per cent above BAU after year 2 of the simulation period.
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The production costs level is falling 2.3 per cent, owing to the urban real wage decline of about 1 per
cent. However, the agricultural sectors benefit from increased food demand and a substantial rise in
output prices, and compete for labour by rising real rural wages by 5 per cent.
With such immediate improvements in rural workers' income level, one might expect the subsistence
production at the agricultural frontier to dwindle. However, the prices of basic grains are increasing
significantly, reducing the value of access to the broader consumer goods basket in comparison to
frontier basic grain production. Within the market economy and for a certain real wage, less goods and
services are now available in addition to basic food consumption, which has become significantly
more costly. Even though employed work in the countryside is being rewarded higher than before, and
expected urban real wage is increasing, this price effect is strong enough to encourage the migration to
the frontier. Hence, in the short run, the rate of deforestation is actually increasing.
The deflationary effect associated with less rigid urban real wages encourages exports to increase, in
particular exports from urban sectors. The increase in profits stimulates investments, since saving rates
are higher among capitalists than workers.
Unemployment is reduced by assumption and the average income for the urban citizen increases by
4.5 per cent in the short term. It actually turns out that urban real wage is reduced by less than 1 per
cent. Rural per capita income level is increasing 5 per cent. The beneficiaries of the flexible real wage
in the short term are thus the former unemployed and people at the countryside, which regain their
income level from BAU after the unfavourable impact of the previous policies.
The consumption level is kept relatively low and real investments high due to the considerable
increase in profits. In the longer term this initiates a take off in terms of economic growth, with GDP
almost 50 per cent above BAU after a decade.
The flexible urban wage initiates rapid growth through an (essentially urban) profit driven
accumulation and growth process. Employment is increasing, and urban real wages are only
moderately lowered by 1 per cent by the end of the simulation period. High investments causes a
significant positive shift in labour productivity, which contributes to keep up the urban wage level.
Consumer demand is increasing (although less than GDP) and the price of basic food items goes up as
well. Basic grain prices rise considerably relative to other goods and services in the consumer basket
available outside the remote frontier and inside the market economy. The intense urban investment
activity assures that a wide variety of consumer goods are supplied at moderate prices due to the
continuous rise in urban productivity. But still it is so that the price effect through increasingly
expensive food in the markets dominates over the incentives to leave the frontier related to the positive
income shift in stationary agriculture and in the cities. Consequently colonists stick to subsistence
farming at the frontier, limiting the reserve of labour available for the growth sectors, which also helps
keep up the general wage level.
In spite of the significant increase in economic growth, the impact on deforestation is still negative
after 10 years. In this case, there is a clear contradiction between urban economic growth and the
conservation of natural resources.
Whether real wages are flexible or not strongly affects the distribution between profit and wage
income. Flexible wages rise profits which in turn are invested and generate growth particularly in the
urban sectors, favoured by the investments. This stimulation of the urban economy is not capable of
counter-weighing the negative impact on rural income opportunities, since private consumption and
demand for food is rising more slowly than GDP. Consequently, the contribution from flexible wages
is to increase deforestation.
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Table 4. Impact of economic reforms on deforestation and main economic variables in
Nicaragua. Deviation from Business As Usual scenario. Year 2000. Per cent
(1)
Reduced public
expenditures
(2)
Sales tax reform
(3)
Reduced trade deficit
(4)
Flexible real wages
(1) (1)+(2) (1)+(2)+(3) (1)+(2)+(3)+(4)
Gross domestic product 4.7 6.3 4.9 47.4
Private consumption 3.1 -2.8 -4.2 29.5
Export 4.2 3.0 2.8 50.4
Import 3.7 2.7 0.5 42.3
Urban real wage - - - -1.0
Rural real wage 2.5 -1.0 -1.6 3.3
Per capita rural income 0.5 -8.9 -9.9 5.0
Per capita urban income 3.3 -3.2 -4.7 40.7
Urban unemployment -2.3 4.6 6.0 -78.7
Annual deforestation -4.8 -13.9 -13.5 -12.2
Total deforested area -1.8 -7.8 -7.9 -3.4
Figure 1. Economic indicators and deforestation. Changes from previous scenario in year 2000
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Figure 2. Per capita income and deforestation. Changes from previous scenario in year 2000
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5. Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the impacts of various economic policies on economic growth and
deforestation in Nicaragua by means of a computable general equilibrium model. A key feature of this
model is that the income level at the agricultural frontier is determined by the price of basic grains,
and not directly linked to the alternative cost of labour within the market economy. This means that
deforestation by squatters is particularly sensitive to distributional aspects which affect the level of
private consumption, the demand for food and food prices.
It is shown that some policies initially intensify the clearing of forest land, but turn out to ease the
pressure on forest capital over time. This trade-off between short and long term effects should be taken
into account under policy formation. An argument for accepting short term increase in deforestation
could be positive distributional effects, like experienced in the case with reduced public expenditures.
Noticeably, improving the fiscal balance by cutting public expenditures or by means of a sales tax
reform both enhance economic growth and conservation of forest. The former policy is efficient in
stimulating growth, while the latter is efficient in conservation. While the rural income level is
conserved under reduced public expenditures, it is being eroded by the sales tax increase, through a
demand induced decline in prices of basic grains. With low prices on basic grain, the migration to
urban surroundings is seen as more beneficial because cheaper grain makes it less hard to make
financial room for a subsistence food consumption level in the cities within a given real wage; i.e. the
alternative cost of staying at the frontier is rising. Thus, the forest conservation associated with a rising
sales tax is driven by a general rural poverty increase.
A flexible urban wage setting would generate more rapid deforestation. The economy would grow at a
considerably higher rate, but the rural wage level would not be much higher than in the reference
scenario. A significant increase in food prices would cancel out the potential benefit from improved
and less uncertain income opportunities within the market economy. Subsistence would be
increasingly attractive under the new price regime. A conclusion is that rapid growth does not
guarantee more forest conservation, as illustrated under the flexible urban wage regime.
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However, there are policies which both stimulate growth and conservation, like reducing the public
expenditures and broadening the tax base. While the former generates no clearly negative
distributional effects, the rural income level is strongly reduced under the sales tax reform. In the latter
case then, conservation is obtained at the cost of increasing poverty in rural areas.
Monitoring and enforcement problems of remote forests in Nicaragua may exclude market based
measures against deforestation by squatters, and also a Pigouvian approach may seem inappropriate as
a corrective measure among the poorest groups of the population. Our study has shown that the
general equilibrium effects of economic policies on the deforestation rate are considerable, and may be
used to identify indirect measures to control deforestation.
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Appendix
An Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) model for Nicaragua
Model equations
1 Composite price: PC XC PD XD pm Mi i i i i i⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ i∈IM
2 Composite price in non-importing sectors:   
PC PDi i= i∈I-IM
3 Value of sale (gross revenue): P X PD XD pe Ei i i i i i⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ i∈EX
4 Unit value of sale in non-exporting sectors:
P PDi i=  i∈I-EX
5 Price on capital: PK PC imati j jij= ⋅∑ i,j∈I
6 Activity level, exporting sectors CET (note: ρei ≥ +1):
X at E XDi i i i i iei ei ei= ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅γ γρ ρ ρ( )1
1
i∈EX
7 Activity level, non-exporting sectors:
X XDi i=  i∈I-EX
8
Commodity composition of output:
E
XD
pe
PD
i
i
i
i
i
i
ei
= ⋅
−
−1
1
1γ
γ
ρ
i∈EX
9
Composite commodities CES: XC ac M XDi i i i i imi mi mi= ⋅ ⋅ + − ⋅
− −
−
δ δρ ρ ρ( )1
1
i∈IM
10 Output in non-importing sextors: XC XDi i=  i∈I-IM
11 Demand for imports:
M
XD
PD
pm
i
i
i
i
i
i
mi
= ⋅
−
+δ
δ
ρ
1
1
1
i∈IM
12 Unit cost: COST PC a W LCi j ji i ij= ⋅ + ⋅∑ i,j∈I
13 Profit: GAN P tv COST Xi i i i i= ⋅ − − ⋅( )1 i∈I
14
Income and consumption
Income working class: Y W LC X er trxkwk i i i wki= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅∑ i∈I
15 Income camposino class: Y dgc GANcp i ii= ⋅∑ i∈R
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16 Income producers class: Y dgs GAN er trxkpr i i pri= ⋅ + ⋅∑ i∈U
17 Income capitalist class:
Y dgc GAN dgs GAN er trxkkp i i j j kpji= − ⋅ + − ⋅ + ⋅∑∑ ( ) ( )1 1 i∈R, j∈U
18 Expenditure: EXPEND s td Yk k k k= − ⋅ − ⋅( ) ( )1 1 k∈K
19 Basic consumption: SUB csub PCk ik ii= ⋅∑ i∈I, k∈K
20 Private consumption (LES): PC CD PC csub q EXPEND SUBi ik i ik ik k k⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ −( )
i∈I, k∈K
21
Wage formation
Rural sector wage: W relw WRi i=  i∈R
22 Urban sector wage: W relw W IPCi i i wk t= −0 1,  i∈U
23
Labour market
Labour supply: LS ls g t= +0 1( )
24
Frontier labour: LF
WF
LS
WF
WX
=




−η ρ1
0
1
25
Rural wage index: ( )WX WF WR= +η ηρ ρ ρ1 2 1
26 Frontier labour: ( )LF U LS LC Xi ii= − −∑1  i∈I
27
Unemployment: ( )WR wu U IPC u
u
wk t
r
= −
−
−
−0 1
0
0
1 1
1,
28
Frontier production and income
Frontier prices: PF Pi i=  i∈B
29 Production function: XF zl LFi i=  i∈B
30 Income per man-year: WF PF zli ii= ∑  i∈B
31 Frontier income: Y WF LFfa = ⋅
32
Investment and saving
Capital in period t+1: KF KF depre DKi t i t it, , ( )+ = ⋅ − +1 1 i∈I
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33 Total investments equal savings: INV s td Y SGOB er sfork k kk= ⋅ − ⋅ + + ⋅∑ ( )1
k∈
K
34 Investment by destination: INV PK DKi ii= ⋅∑ i∈I
35 Sectoral investment: DK kshare DKTOTi i= ⋅ i∈ I
36
Government
Government revenue:
GR tv P X pm M te pe E td Yi i i
tm
tm i i i i ii k kk
i
i
= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅+∑ ∑1 i∈I, k∈K
37 Government expenditure: GD gshare gdtoti i= ⋅ 0 i∈I
38 Government consumption: GR PC GD SGOBi ii= ⋅ +∑ i∈I
39
Equilibrium of demand and supply
XC a X CD GD imat DK csubi ij jj ik ik ij jj i fa= ⋅ + + + ⋅ +∑ ∑ ∑ , i∈I, k∈K
40
Production
Production: X ad b LC X KFi i i i i i
i i
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
−
α α1 i∈I
41 Consumer price index: IPC
PC CD
CDk
i iki
iki
=
⋅∑
∑ i∈I, k∈
K
42 Demand for labour: W LC GAN
Xi i
i
i
i
i
⋅ =
−
⋅
α
α1
i∈I
List of variables
Endogenous variables:
CDik = Demand for commodity i by class k
COSTi = Unit cost of production
DKi = Investment by sector of destination
DKTOT = Total real investments
Ei = Exports of commodity i in local currency
EXPENDk = Expenditure on consumption by class k
GANi = Total profit in sector i
GDi = Government expenditure on commodity i
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GR = Total income to the government
INV = Total nominal investment
IPCk = Consumer price index for class k
KFi = Capital by sector
LCi = Labour per activity unit in sector i
LS = Labour supply
LF = Labour at the frontier
Mi = Imports of commodity i in local currency
Pi = Output price
PCi = Composite price of domestic and imported commodities
PDi = Price of domestic commodity i
PFi = Prices at the frontier
PKi = Price of capital
SGOB = Government saving
SUBk = Basic consumption by social class
U = Unemployment rate
Wi = Wage rate
WF = Imputed income per man-year at the agricultural frontier
WR = Rural wage rate
WX = Rural wage index
Xi = Activity in sector i
XFi = Production at the agricultural frontier
XCi = Composite commodity of domestic and imported products
XDi = National production for the domestic market
Yk = Nominal income by class k
Exogenous variables and parameters:
αi = Cost share of labour
γi = Share parameter in export equation
δi = Share parameter in creation of composite commodity
η1 = Allocation parameter
η2 = Allocation parameter
ρ = Transformation parameter in rural wage index
ρei = Transformation parameter in export equation
ρmi = Transformation parameter in import equation
aij = Input-Output coefficient
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aci = Shift parameter in creation of composite commodity
adi = Shift parameter in Cobb-Douglas production function
ati = Shift parameter in activity equation
bi = Shift parameter due to erosion
csubik = Basic consumption
depre = Depreciation rate of capital
dgci = Distributional coefficient of profits - farmers
dgsi = Distributional coefficient of profits - producers
er = Exchange rate
g = Growth rate of population
gdtot0 = Total real government consumption in base year
gsharei = Government expenditure coefficient
imatij = Conversion matrix from destination to origin in investment
indexi = Wage indexation rule
ksharei = Share coefficient on total investment
ls0 = Total labour supply in base year
qik = Budget share of consumption by class
pe0i = Price of exports in local currency
pm0i = Price of competitive imports in local currency
pwei = World price on exports in $
pwmi = World price on competitive imports in $
sk = Marginal propensity to consume by class
sfor = Foreign savings
tdk = Direct taxes on income
tei = Tariff rate on exports
tmi = Tax on competitive goods imports
trxkk = Transfers from abroad to class k in $
tvi = Tax on value added
ur0 = Urban unemployment rate in base year
u0 = Unemployment rate in base year
wu0 = Urban nominal wage rate in the base year
zli = Production per man-year at the frontier
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List of sectors (I)
No. Abbrivation Name Agr.
frontier
Agri-
culture
Rural/
Urban
Import Export
1. CF Production of Coffee AGR R EX
2. AG Production of Cotton AGR R EX
3. BA Production of Bananas AGR R EX
4. AJ Production of Sesame AGR R IM EX
5. AZ Production of Sugar AGR R
6. MZ Production of Maize B AGR R IM
7. FR Production of Beans B AGR R IM
8. AR Production of Rice B AGR R IM
9. SG Production of Sorghum AGR R IM
10. OA Other agriculture AGR R IM EX
11. PC Production of Cattle AGR R IM
12. SV Forestry R IM EX
13. PS Fishery R EX
14. MN Mining R IM EX
15. AL Production of Food and
Beverages
U IM EX
16. VT Production of Textiles U IM EX
17. QM Production of Chemicals U IM EX
18. PT Oil production U IM EX
19. OV Other industries U IM EX
20. EL Production of Electricity U IM EX
21. AP Water services U
22. CT Construction U
23. SC Other Services U IM EX
24. TR Production of Transport and
Communication Services
U IM EX
25. ES Education and health U
26. CM Trade U
Social classes (K)
1. CP Campesinos (farmers)
2. WK Urban workers
3. PR Urban small proprietors (small producers)
4. KP Capitalists
5 FA Frontier farmers
25
Recent publications in the series Discussion Papers
107 S. Kverndokk (1994): Depletion of Fossil Fuels and the
Impacts of Global Warming
108 K.A. Magnussen (1994): Precautionary Saving and Old-
Age Pensions
109 F. Johansen (1994): Investment and Financial Con-
straints: An Empirical Analysis of Norwegian Firms
110 K.A. Brekke and P. Børing (1994): The Volatility of Oil
Wealth under Uncertainty about Parameter Values
111 M.J. Simpson (1994): Foreign Control and Norwegian
Manufacturing Performance
112 Y. Willassen and T.J. Klette (1994): Correlated
Measurement Errors, Bound on Parameters, and a Model
of Producer Behavior
113 D. Wetterwald (1994): Car ownership and private car
use. A microeconometric analysis based on Norwegian
data
114 K.E. Rosendahl (1994): Does Improved Environmental
Policy Enhance Economic Growth? Endogenous Growth
Theory Applied to Developing Countries
115 L. Andreassen, D. Fredriksen and O. Ljones (1994): The
Future Burden of Public Pension Benefits. A
Microsimulation Study
116 A. Brendemoen (1994): Car Ownership Decisions in
Norwegian Households.
117 A. Langørgen (1994): A Macromodel of Local
Government Spending Behaviour in Norway
118 K.A. Brekke (1994): Utilitarism, Equivalence Scales and
Logarithmic Utility
119 K.A. Brekke, H. Lurås and K. Nyborg (1994): Sufficient
Welfare Indicators: Allowing Disagreement in
Evaluations of Social Welfare
120 T.J. Klette (1994): R&D, Scope Economies and Com-
pany Structure: A "Not-so-Fixed Effect" Model of Plant
Performance
121 Y. Willassen (1994): A Generalization of Hall's Speci-
fication of the Consumption function
122 E. Holmøy, T. Hægeland and Ø. Olsen (1994): Effective
Rates of Assistance for Norwegian Industries
123 K. Mohn (1994): On Equity and Public Pricing in
Developing Countries
124 J. Aasness, E. Eide and T. Skjerpen (1994): Crimi-
nometrics, Latent Variables, Panel Data, and Different
Types of Crime
125 E. Biørn and T.J. Klette (1994): Errors in Variables and
Panel Data: The Labour Demand Response to Permanent
Changes in Output
126 I. Svendsen (1994): Do Norwegian Firms Form
Extrapolative Expectations?
127 T.J. Klette and Z. Griliches (1994): The Inconsistency of
Common Scale Estimators when Output Prices are
Unobserved and Endogenous
128 K.E. Rosendahl (1994): Carbon Taxes and the Petroleum
Wealth
129 S. Johansen and A. Rygh Swensen (1994): Testing
Rational Expectations in Vector Autoregressive Models
130 T.J. Klette (1994): Estimating Price-Cost Margins and
Scale Economies from a Panel of Microdata
131 L. A. Grünfeld (1994): Monetary Aspects of Business
Cycles in Norway: An Exploratory Study Based on
Historical Data
132 K.-G. Lindquist (1994): Testing for Market Power in the
Norwegian Primary Aluminium Industry
133 T. J. Klette (1994): R&D, Spillovers and Performance
among Heterogenous Firms. An Empirical Study Using
Microdata
134 K.A. Brekke and H.A. Gravningsmyhr (1994): Adjusting
NNP for instrumental or defensive expenditures. An
analytical approach
135 T.O. Thoresen (1995): Distributional and Behavioural
Effects of Child Care Subsidies
136 T. J. Klette and A. Mathiassen (1995): Job Creation, Job
Destruction and Plant Turnover in Norwegian
Manufacturing
137 K. Nyborg (1995): Project Evaluations and Decision
Processes
138 L. Andreassen (1995): A Framework for Estimating
Disequilibrium Models with Many Markets
139 L. Andreassen (1995): Aggregation when Markets do not
Clear
140 T. Skjerpen (1995): Is there a Business Cycle Com-
ponent in Norwegian Macroeconomic Quarterly Time
Series?
141 J.K. Dagsvik (1995): Probabilistic Choice Models for
Uncertain Outcomes
142 M. Rønsen (1995): Maternal employment in Norway, A
Parity-Specific Analysis of the Return to Full-Time and
Part-Time Work after Birth
143 A. Bruvoll, S. Glomsrød and H. Vennemo (1995): The
Environmental Drag on Long- Term Economic Perfor-
mance: Evidence from Norway
144 T. Bye and T. A. Johnsen (1995): Prospects for a Com-
mon, Deregulated Nordic Electricity Market
145 B. Bye (1995): A Dynamic Equilibrium Analysis of a
Carbon Tax
146 T. O. Thoresen (1995): The Distributional Impact of the
Norwegian Tax Reform Measured by Disproportionality
147 E. Holmøy and T. Hægeland (1995): Effective Rates of
Assistance for Norwegian Industries
148 J. Aasness, T. Bye and H.T. Mysen (1995): Welfare
Effects of Emission Taxes in Norway
149 J. Aasness, E. Biørn and Terje Skjerpen (1995):
Distribution of Preferences and Measurement Errors in a
Disaggregated Expenditure System
150 E. Bowitz, T. Fæhn, L. A. Grünfeld and K. Moum
(1995): Transitory Adjustment Costs and Long Term
Welfare Effects of an EU-membership – The Norwegian
Case
151 I. Svendsen (1995): Dynamic Modelling of Domestic
Prices with Time-varying Elasticities and Rational
Expectations
152 I. Svendsen (1995): Forward- and Backward Looking
Models for Norwegian Export Prices
153 A. Langørgen (1995): On the Simultaneous
Determination of Current Expenditure, Real Capital, Fee
Income, and Public Debt in Norwegian Local
Government
26
154 A. Katz and T. Bye(1995): Returns to Publicly Owned
Transport Infrastructure Investment. A Cost Function/
Cost Share Approach for Norway, 1971-1991
155 K. O. Aarbu (1995): Some Issues About the Norwegian
Capital Income Imputation Model
156 P. Boug, K. A. Mork and T. Tjemsland (1995): Financial
Deregulation and Consumer Behavior: the Norwegian
Experience
157 B.E. Naug and R. Nymoen (1995): Import Price
Formation and Pricing to Market: A Test on Norwegian
Data
158 R. Aaberge (1995): Choosing Measures of Inequality for
Empirical Applications
159 T.J. Klette and S.E. Førre (1995): Innovation and Job
Creation in a Small Open Economy: Evidence from
Norwegian Manufacturing Plants 1982-92
160 S. Holden, D. Kolsrud and B. Vikøren (1995): Noisy
Signals in Target Zone Regimes: Theory and Monte
Carlo Experiments
161 T. Hægeland (1996): Monopolistic Competition,
Resource Allocation and the Effects of Industrial Policy
162 S. Grepperud (1996): Poverty, Land Degradation and
Climatic Uncertainty
163 S. Grepperud (1996): Soil Conservation as an Investment
in Land
164 K.A. Brekke, V. Iversen and J. Aune (1996): Soil Wealth
in Tanzania
165 J.K. Dagsvik, D.G. Wetterwald and R. Aaberge (1996):
Potential Demand for Alternative Fuel Vehicles
166 J.K. Dagsvik (1996): Consumer Demand with
Unobservable Product Attributes. Part I: Theory
167 J.K. Dagsvik (1996): Consumer Demand with
Unobservable Product Attributes. Part II: Inference
168 R. Aaberge, A. Björklund, M. Jäntti, M. Palme, P. J.
Pedersen, N. Smith and T. Wennemo (1996): Income
Inequality and Income Mobility in the Scandinavian
Countries Compared to the United States
169 K. Nyborg (1996): Some Norwegian Politicians' Use of
Cost-Benefit Analysis
170 E. Berg, S. Kverndokk and K. E. Rosendahl (1996):
Market Power, International CO2  Taxation and
Petroleum Wealth
171 R. Aaberge, U. Colombino and S. Strøm (1996): Welfare
Effects of Proportional Taxation: Empirical Evidence
from Italy, Norway and Sweden
172 J.K. Dagsvik (1996): Dynamic Choice, Multistate
Duration Models and Stochastic Structure
173 J.K. Dagsvik (1996): Aggregation in Matching Markets
174 H.C. Bjørnland (1996): The Dynamic Effects of
Aggregate Demand, Supply and Oil Price Shocks
175 A. Bruvoll and K. Ibenholt (1996): Future Waste
Generation. Forecasts Based on a Macroeconomic Model
176 T. Fæhn and L. A. Grünfeld (1996) Recent Leaps
Towards Free Trade. The Impact on Norwegian Industry
and Trade Patterns
177 R. Barrell and K. A. Magnussen (1996): Counterfactual
Analyses of Oil price Shocks using a World Model
178 E. Bowitz and S. I. Hove (1996): Business cycles and
fiscal policy: Norway 1973-93
179 H.C. Bjørnland (1996): Sources of Business Cycles in
Energy Producing Economies: The case of Norway and
United Kingdom
180 K. Nyborg (1996): The Political Man and Contingent
Valuation: Motives Do Count
181 E. Berg, S. Kverndokk and K.E. Rosendahl (1996):
Gains from Cartelisation in the Oil Market
182 R. Aaberge and I. Aslaksen (1996): Decomposition of
the Gini Coefficient by Income Components: Various
Types of Applications and Interpretations
183 B. Bye (1996): Taxation, Unemployment and Growth:
Dynamic Welfare Effects of "Green" Policies
184 T.J. Klette and F. Johansen (1996): Accumulation of
R&D Capital and Dynamic Firm Performance: A Not-so-
fixed Effect Model
185 B. Bye (1996): Environmental Tax Reform and Producer
Foresight: An Intertemporal Computable General
Equilibrium Analysis
186 S. Grepperud (1997): Soil Depletion Choices under
Production and Price Uncertainty
187 N.M. Stølen and T. Åvitsland (1997): Has Growth in
Supply of Educated Persons Been Important for the
Composition of Employment?
188 T.J. Klette and Z. Griliches (1997): Empirical Patterns of
Firm Growth and R&D Investment: a Quality Ladder
Model Interpretation
189 J. Aune, S. Glomsrød, V. Iversen and H. Wiig (1997):
Structural Adjustment and Soil Degradation in Tanzania.
A CGE-model Approach with Endogenous Soil
Productivity
190 E. Biørn and T.J. Klette (1997): Panel Data with Errors-
in-Variables: A Note on Essential and Redundant
Orthogonality Conditions in GMM-estimation
191 L. Belsby and B.K. Wold (1997): Primary Schooling in
Zambia Squeezed at Community and Household Level
192 E. Bowitz and Å. Cappelen (1997): Incomes Policies and
the Norwegian Economy 1973-93
193 S. Glomsrød, M.D Monge A. and H. Wennemo (1997):
Structural Adjustment and Deforestation in Nicaragua
